I would not usually place my intellectual writing in a public forum, but I think that this paper that I have struggled so hard to write has something important to say that someone may need to hear. So, for my readers, I appreciate your willingness to hear me and your reflections and comments are very welcome.
(Painting by Kellie Romany, entitled “Labiaplasty”)
Introduction: The Prostitute as the Sexual Monster
From the historical and cultural milieu of the “enlightenment” cities of Paris and London, the nineteenth-century marked the “discovery” of the “sexual monster,” an admixture of sexual perversity and primitivism. While prostitutes, whores, and les filles de noce had long existed prior to this period, with the colonial conquests of the West into “savage” and “primitive” worlds, the nineteenth-century marked the merging of the monstrous and the filles de noce. According to Foucault, the sexual monster is a development arising out of the eighteenth century in which connections were made between the monster, a perversion of natural and civil law and, the masturbator, the common sexual deviant. While Foucault situates the sexual monster in the second half of the eighteenth century, it seems that it is in the nineteenth century that the sexual monster proper is discovered, and numerically, morphologically, and judicially identified, categorized, and then condemned.
It is my contention that an environment of normalcy develops and creates the cultural context for the co-mingling of the monstrous and the sexually deviant. For instance, in his The Taming of Chance, Ian Hacking notes that “Only around 1840 did the practice of measurement become fully established,” and thus it was in the nineteenth century with the influence of Auguste Compte’s postivist philosophy that we can find “the roots of the idea…that one can improve—control—a deviant subpopulation by enumeration and classification.” Moreover, attempting to understand the seeming modern cultural imperative of normalcy, Lennard J. Davis points out that while statistics has its origins in 18th century with Gottfried Achenwall’s assessment of the state, statistical analysis was not applied to the body until Bisset Hawkins in 1829 and l’homme moyen did not emerge, even in professional jargon, until later in the century with the French statistician Adolphe Quetelet. Thus, one could contend the sexual monster proper does not explicitly take form until the nineteenth century when, as Foucault contends, “a technology of human abnormality, a technology of abnormal individuals appears.”
With the advent of a scientific methodology based on measurement and a discourse of normalcy, the sexual monster transformed the prostitute, the white sexually deviant woman, into the primitive—creating a mixture of the animal, the human, and the sexual. Thus, the prostitute became an extraordinary body not only as a gendered and sexed being, but moreover as an embodiment of primitive otherness. Consequently, while it is in the eighteenth century that Carl Linnaeus adds a fifth human subspecies, homo sapiens monstrous, partly based on assumptions about the Hottentot women and her mysterious “aprons,” and the Hottentot man and his supposed single testicle, it is in 1810 that Sara Baartman—providing material “evidence” of primitive monstrosity and promiscuous sexuality—makes her debut in London at 225 Piccadilly and becomes infamously known as the “Hottentot Venus.” As T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting argues, it is through the image of the venus noire that the prostitute and prostitution takes on newly perverse social and cultural meanings. Consequently, this paper explores the prostituted body, as a site for encoding the extraordinary, as not merely a sexed body or even a gendered body, but as a primitively other body—as the sexual monster.
From Whore to Sexual Monster: The Hottentot Venus and Constructions of Sexual Primitiveness
The monster, according to Foucault, is an anomaly of both nature and society. Thus he contends that monstrosity cannot merely be a mishap of nature but rather denotes a disruption of “civil, canon, or religious law.” Thus, monstrosity extends beyond the parameters of disability, which still abides to the law, and is to the contrary “the kind of natural irregularity that calls law into question and disables it.” The monster is essentially, and according to Foucault “by definition the exception.” Yet, he contends that in comparison to the eighteenth century, the monstrosity of the nineteenth century is not necessarily a type that can be discovered without a trained clinical eye. This monster is rather a mixture of “eccentricities, kinds of imperfection, errors of nature.” Consequently, the sexual monster emerges into the nineteenth-century as a perversion not only of civil and natural law, but also of moral decree.
The creation of Sara Baartman as the primitive and sexual spectacle became a material manifestation of monstrosity and perverse sexuality that “respectable” English and French gentlemen and women could observe, poke, and prod out of curiosity in exchange for money. As the spectacle of the extraordinary, as Crais and Scully elaborate,
The Hottentot Venus became the first figure from African to “win publicity” in the nineteenth century. From 1810, Sara stood for more than just herself, just as scientists, scholars, and the post-apartheid nation would again demand of her in different ways after her death. Her body became the foundation for the later far more stylized entrepreneurial forms that constituted the nineteenth-century freak show and for the development of racial science.
Yet, her body as an emblem of both monstrosity and perverse sexuality would set her apart from other forms of freakery. Inspecting her genitalia and her buttocks, through their trained clinical gaze, the white male scientists “discovered” and detailed the “hypersexuality and uncontrolled drives in the female Hottentot body,” a body that was understood as part human but unequivocally animalistic. Thus, as Crais and Scully argue the “Scientists married primitiveness to sexuality, the instincts, and urges revealing the essence of the lower species.” Thus, one could contend that Sara Baartman became the sexual monster per excellence of the nineteenth century. Under the clinical gaze, her body signified a double negation both the monstrosity of nature and the monstrosity of conduct, and provided the basis for an understanding of women, in general, as sexually primitive, and prostitutes, in particular, as sexually monstrous.
Figure 1: 1810 based drawing of the “Hottentot venus” on display in London
Lombroso and the Venus Noire: The Prostitute as Sexually Perverse & Primitive
In 1893, at the end of the nineteenth century, Cesare Lombroso coauthored with Guglilmo Ferrer La donna delinquente, which would become a seminal yet, deeply problematic work on female criminality. First published in Italian, Nicole Hahn Rafter and Mary Gibson note that “[t]his work, more than any other book in Western history, determined directions taken in the field of study, albeit in recent decades by providing a backdrop against which feminist criminologists have lobbed very different ideas.” Thus, as problematic as it may be, it constitutes a significant cultural conversational piece on the relationship between gendered bodies, the primitive, and criminality.
Utilizing the “primitive”—particularly, Hottentot women, Native American women, and other so-called “savages”— as an explanatory framework for female perversion and criminality, Lombroso argues that sexual deviance is derivative of women’s innately primitive nature. Consequently, the Hottentot Venus and her equally sexually monstrous cousins become the litmus test for white female sexual perversion, and in particular, a “scientific” explanation for the female prostitute. As Crais and Scully note,
Sara Baartman had been reduced not simply to men’s image of her body but to men’s image of her genitals and the ways the organs of sexual pleasure stood for character, her very being. White women, even the most civilized, were liable to fall victim to their animal instincts and passions, to revert to their Hottentot selves.
Thus, ontologically and morphologically, “European prostitutes” whom had previously been merely whores, a woman-for-hire, now “became degenerate women, literally women who had become more Hottentot.” Theorizing “prostitution [as] closer than criminality to woman’s primitive behavior,” Lombroso concludes that to some extent all (white) women have a Hottentot self, and thus sexual monstrosity and primitiveness—like Foucault’s common masturbator—is an ordinary and primary character of every woman that must be controlled and repressed. Through the figure of the Hottentot Venus, in particular, and the primitive sexual monster, in general, who both represent a position of double exceptionality, it seems that the cultural and judicial atmosphere was created and facilitated for a discourse of monstrosity that in its interrogation of conduct “is no longer juridico-natural but juridico-moral” and thus for these otherwise normative (white) women, they become primarily scrutinized under “a monstrosity of conduct rather than the monstrosity of nature.”
Figure 2: Physiology of Russian prostitutes. (Lombroso, La donna delinquente, 1893.)
Figure 3: Physiology of Russian offenders. (Lombroso, La donna delinquente, 1893.)
While the female nature remains a terrain to be carefully assessed for deviance by the trained clinical (male) eye—such as for anomalies of the brain, vulva, buttocks, and face—, for the prostitute and sexual promiscuous woman, their conduct is what ultimately demonstrates their monstrosity. Thus, while Lombroso is able to often identify the criminal woman based on certain anomalies and masculine features, on the other hand, he notes,
…in prostitutes we have women of great youth in whom the “beauty of the devil,” with its abundance of soft, fresh flesh and absence of wrinkles, masks anomalies. Another thing to keep in mind is that prostitution calls for a relative lack of peculiarities such as large jaw and hardened stare which, if present, might cause disgust and repulsions; it also requires that such peculiarities be concealed through artifice. Certainly makeup—a virtual requirement of the prostitute’s sad trade—minimizes many of the degenerative characteristics that female criminals exhibit openly.
As such, one can assert that the Hottentot morphologically based proclivities of the prostitute are thus carefully hidden under their “aprons.” Making connections between the adoption of domestic servant attire by prostitutes—noting that domestic servants were often seen as sexually available in comparison to their male employers’ respectable wives—and the Parisian obsession with the “Hottentot apron,” Sharpley-Whiting argues that in nineteenth-century Paris the “apron” became a fetishized representation of “the corrupting and venal sex, the prostitute’s sex, or the sex of one who has prostitute proclivities as signified by her trade and dress – that is, the maid.” Like the Hottentot Venus, who was able to partially hide the proof of her degeneracy between her thighs, Lombroso constructs the prostitute as a more atavistic woman (than the common female criminal) that is able to keep veiled her sexual monstrosity under “the apron [that] covers the apron.”
The “apron” of the prostitute, or the sexually promiscuous woman, provided a cover for her innately primitive morphology and temperament. Accordingly, based on perceived anomalies of the female genitalia, Lombroso, as Sander Gilman argues, correlates blackness as exemplified by the Hottentot woman to the prostitute, such that “The primitive is the black, and the qualities of blackness, or at least of the black female, are those of the prostitute” and thus by consequence, “The perception of the prostitute in the late nineteenth century thus merged with the perception of the black.” The primitive and particularly the noire venus emerge as primary examples of the undisclosed sexual perversity of women, particularly the prostitute. As such, Lombroso contends,
Primitive woman was rarely a murder; but she was always a prostitute, and so she remained until the end of the semibarbaric period. Atavism again explains why prostitutes have more regressive traits than do female criminals… The prostitute… has a greater atavistic resemblance to the primitive woman—the vagabond Venus—and thus she has greater dullness of touch and taste, greater fondness for tattooing, and so on… This is because criminals are exceptions among civilized people, and women are exceptions among criminals, women’s natural form of regression being prostitution, not crime. Primitive woman was a prostitute rather than a criminal.
Thus, the primary transgression of the primitive woman, who was envisioned as bad, masculine, and innately promiscuous, was not crime but rather sexual perversity, and hence the (white) normative woman, whom was generally understood as good, feminine, and civilized was seen as being most susceptible not to crimes such as murder, theft, etc. but rather to her sexually deviant and repressed primitive nature.
Figure 5: Negro Venus and Patagonian girl (Lombroso, La donna delinquente, 1893). Editor’s note: Although there is no indication that this [negro] woman had broken the law, Lombroso uses her photograph to demonstrate the supposedly savage, masculine appearance of black women, traits he then uses to illustrate his theory that criminals are atavisms. In the case of this young South American Indian, too, Lombroso is trying to draw a connection between “savage races” and criminals. (See Lombroso, Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman, 149, figures 20-21).
Within this nineteenth-century cultural milieu, the prostitute became “the vagabond Venus,” the venus noire, who exemplified the most deviant and perverse of sexual transgressions. This black venus cultivated a discourse through which the prostitute could be understood in the nineteenth-century and far beyond. Despite the fact that, as Sharpley-Whiting notes, black prostitutes represented a minority in nineteenth-century Parisian society, white male desire for the exotic and the extraordinary, projected the black venus as the epitome of modern prostitution. Accordingly, Sharpley-Whiting contends that while,
The Roman deity of beauty, Venus, was also revered as the protectress of Roman prostitutes, who in her honor erected Venus temples of worship. Within these temples, instruction in the arts of love was given to aspiring courtesans. It is the latter image of prostitution, sexuality, and danger that reproduced itself in narrative and was projected onto black female bodies. The projection of the Venus image, of prostitute proclivities, onto black female bodies allows the French writer to maintain a position of moral, sexual, and racial superiority.
We can substitute “French writer” here for the “white western man,” in general, for this cultural phenomenon became an embodied script for cultural interaction and social postitionality throughout the nineteenth-century western world. Moreover, I would contend that it is through the cultural phenomenon of the black venus that we can begin to understand the politics of signification and othering at the root of prostitution and sex trafficking in our present era.
L’Autre: Prostitution, The Black Venus, and A Politics of Othering
Unfortunately, the Hottentot Venus is not a cultural phenomenon of the past. The black venus has been transformed into a cultural logic of othering in which, as Sharpley-Whiting notes, “black females” and other prostituted selves, I would add, “are perpetually ensnared, imprisoned in an essence of themselves created from without: Black Venus.” This cultural emblem has transferred the double exceptionality of the sexual monster, its exclusion based both on its primary otherness and its perceived sexual perversion, on to the prostituted bodies, in general. Thus, in my conceptualization of this cultural and political issue, prostituted bodies are not merely the bodies of women who are “women-for-hire,” in particular, but also the bodies of women, such as black woman and other others—children, indigenous women, etc.—, who are imagined and constructed as sexually available and willing.
A product of the ancestral legacy of Hegel and western male thinkers prior to him, the postitionality of the other in relationship to the self has long concerned western feminist philosophies of female subjectivity. While Simone de Beauvoir, in The Second Sex, famously proclaims, “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” and thus rejects the secondary status of women as other to men, she projects woman’s inability to be “equal” (to men) as a product of their womanliness that they must overcome. She, thus, argues that women must learn to “enact the fact of all humanity in their personal existence.” Yet, Luce Irigaray argues that the problem lies not in the conduct and mindset of women, but rather in that “the fundamental model of the human being remained unchanged: one, singular, solitary, historically masculine, the paradigmatic Western adult male, rational, capable.” Thus, others were essentially “only copies of the idea of man, a potentially perfect idea, which all the more or less imperfect copies had to struggle to equal.” Consequently, for Irigary, Beauvoir’s inability to see woman as an other, in and of themselves, represents “a theoretical and practical error, since [her assertions] imply the negation of an/other (woman) [d’un(e) autre] equal in value to that of the subject.” Thus, Irigaray fundamentally argues that l’autre should not be seen as essentially the other in relationship to the self, but rather that the other should constitute its own subjectivity. She contends, “Instead of refusing to be the other gender [l’autre genre], the other sex, what I ask is to be considered as actually an/other woman [une autre], irreducible to the masculine subject.” Irigaray theorizes a move away from a model of singular subjectivity to a model of dual subjectivities, which are understood as different rather than ontologically mediated in relationship to one another. As such, Irigaray insists that “we must be careful to treat the other as the other,” rather than a reflection of the self, i.e. masculine subjectivity. Thus, “man” does not remain the self, “man,” too, is reconstituted as the other.
Irigaray’s conception of l’autre, the other, provides an important template for considering other subjectivies beyond the man/woman paradigm. As she contends, the problem with the positionality of the other is not its alterity but rather its perceived relationship to a sole subjective position. I do not intend to overemphasis or distort otherness—and therefore leave no ground for conversations regarding sameness—, but rather to discuss a means for allowing alterity to exist as merely a description rather than a negation. The religious historian, Charles Long made the following remarks to this effect:
…on a descriptive live, one cannot deny that there are peoples and cultures of dark-skinned, kinky-haired human beings who do not wear clothing in the manner of the cultures of the investigators, and, in addition, they express very different meanings regarding their orientations in their worlds. While this may be true on the descriptive and analytical levels, the fact that these characteristics were noted as the basis for significant differences is often unexplored. In other words, what leads one to locate differences within what is the common? More often than not, the differences that bring a culture or a people to the attention of the investigator are not simply formed from the point of view of the intellectual problematic; they are more often than not the nuances and latencies of that power which is part of the structure of the cultural contact itself manifesting itself as intellectual curiosity. In this manner the cultures of non-Western peoples were created as products of a complex signification.
Long is concerned with the very politics of difference and intellectual curiosity that signified Sara Baartman as the Hottentot Venus and then the black venus, in general, as the embodiment of the sexual promiscuity of the prostitute. This type of politics of difference and othering, which had its roots in the colonial project, creates, according to Long, “empirical others… a cultural phenomenon in which the extraordinariness and uniqueness of a person or culture is first recognized negatively.” The black venus (and her prostituted cousins) is exactly this sort of cultural phenomenon.
Yet, Irigarary’s model of alterity provides a lens through which we can restructure these signifying practices into practices for cultivating an understanding of the diversity of human subjectivies. The self—the white, western, male, singular notion of humanness—must be replaced by a model of l’autre in which subjectivity and humanity is conceived of as multiple and dynamic. Only in providing room for subjectivies can others be known and understood on their own terms rather than through the lens of a normativizing gaze. For prostituted bodies, politically, this means understanding their multiple and diverse embodiments as not only a reflection of perversion but rather a manifestation of merely their alternative subjectivities—meaning that, for instance, prostituted bodies can no longer be the exceptions to the rules of rape and violence. To conclude that prostituted bodies are not capable of being raped is to continue to uphold a white, western, and masculine subjectivity that privileges white female “respectability” as the only viable form of humanity. Consequently, the politics of prostitution and sex trafficking brings to the forefront that as long as our legal system operates on the basis of a common citizen (with a singular subjectivity), extraordinary embodiments will continue to be exploited, raped, violated, murdered, and rendered invisible.
Irigaray, however, calls for a politics of alterity that would allow for “special rights,” contending that “the lack of special rights for women does not allow them to move from a state of nature to a civilized state: the majority remain nature-bodies, subservient to the State, to the Church, to father and husband, without access to the status of civilians, responsible for themselves and the community.” Yet, the notion of “special rights” seems to undermine the otherness of the masculine subject that Irigaray wishes to attain. How then do others participate as political subjects in a judicial system that operates based upon the singular subjectivity of the white, western, bourgeois, masculine self? This thus brings us to Wendy Brown’s arguments, in her States of Injury, in which he points outs,
The postmodern exposure of the imposed and created rather than discovered character of all knowledges—of the power-suffused, struggle-produced quality of all truths, including reigning political and scientific ones—simultaneously exposes the groundlessness of discovered norms or visions… Our alternative to reliance upon such normative claims would seem to be engagement in political struggles in which there are no trump cards such as “morality” or “truth.” Our alternative, in other words, is to struggle within an amoral political habitat for temporally bound and fully contestable visions of who we are and how we ought live.
Yet, as Brown states, the question remains as to whether we are willing to give up the foundations of morality and truth, in order, to live in a political milieu peopled by multiple subjectivies. For Brown, this means moving from speaking of “I am”—a reversion to a fixed and solitary subjectivity—to instead speaking politically of “I want”—in order to recover a sense of being prior to sovereign subjectivity. Giorgio Agamben, similarly states, that since the fundamental nature of the state is formulated based upon the inclusion/exclusion paradigm in which the sovereign power creates its meaning out of exclusion, i.e. the bare life, the state will forever participate in a politics of omission, that is,
…until a completely new politics—that is, a politics no longer founded on exceptio of bare life—is at hand, every theory and every praxis will remain imprisoned and immobile, and the “beautiful day” of life will be given citizenship only either through blood and death or in the perfect senselessness to which the society of the spectacle condemns.
For our purposes, this bare life, this exception, is the prostituted body—the bodies of exploited black venuses, whom have been deemed the exception to normative morality, nature, and judicial order, and thus essentially constitute non-citizens. As this essay has attempted to demonstrate, the extraordinary bodies of the prostituted are at the center of a politics of othering that by deeming them sexual monsters and hence exceptions continues to participate in their exploitation, rape, and trafficking.
Conclusion: Re-Thinking the Extraordinary and Bodies that Matter
What does it mean to view prostituted bodies as “extraordinary bodies”? This essay has explored the terrain of prostitution as a discourse on gendered/sexed, cultural, and morphological otherness, in order to uncover the terrain of the extraordinary as the cultural playground in which both norms and deviants are created. As Rosemarie Garland-Thomson suggests, “the meanings attributed to extraordinary bodies reside not in inherent physical flaws, but in social relationships in which one group is legitimated by possessing valued physical characteristics and maintains its ascendancy and its self-identity by systematically imposing the role of cultural or corporeal inferiority on others.” Yet, these same extraordinary bodies introduce “challenges to the cultural status quo,” and in this sense, I would contend that the extraordinariness of prostituted bodies is in their trans-flexibility or, in other words, their embodied trans-gression, their ability to take on and trans-form the “norm.” The prostituted body is transcoded with multiple and conflicting meanings that speak to the social power struggles for “correct” identity and social positioning. In this sense, the prostituted body is the body through and on which conflicts about marriage, race, ethnicity, religion, immigration and sex/gender are encoded and even re-inscribed. The prostituted body, thus, in general, is the materialization of a politics of otherness and othering that participates in identifying alterity as essentially negative and in need of repression and control.
Through their “spoiled identities,” in the words of Erving Goffman, prostituted bodies implore the “normate” to explore how their otherness “shore[s] up” the legal, the political, the sexual, the moral, the social, and the religious self. It is often assumed that prostitution is a system or even a career in which women “exploit” the needs and desires of men or vice verse men “exploit” the economic needs of women. Yet, as this essay has attempted to illustrate, the prostitute is not really any individual person but rather a phantasm, more precisely, the signification of persons as other, such as: the “sexually liberated” female body, the economically deprived, the religiously anomalous, the ethnic, the polygamous, the grotesque, etc. I would contend that in many ways, the prostituted body is the abject body par excellence—the exception to the masculine and bourgeois subject position and its sovereignty. As Judith Butler puts it, “This exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed thus requires the simultaneous production of a domain of abject bodies, those who are not yet “subjects,” but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject.” As Butler further more iterates, these abject bodies which do not completely materialize define the boundaries of and “materializ[e] the norm,” and thus participate in the qualification of “bodies that matter.” Consequently, Butler implores us to consider, “What challenge does that excluded and abjected realm produce to a symbolic hegemony that might force a radical rearticulation of what qualifies as bodies that matter, ways of living that count as “life,” lives worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving?”
Located within a postitionality of abjectivity, the prostituted body can provide a means for us to reformulate our politics of the extraordinary. In coming to except prostituted bodies as une autre subjectivity, we are forced to reorient our very ontological and moral existence to account for beings, and thus to address alterity as a description rather than an ethical judgment. It is only through this process that we can begin to challenge the types of bodies and embodiments that “matter.” This essay, thus, necessarily leaves the reader with more questions than answers, and yet I hope that it has provided a lens through which to re-think the politics and culture of prostitution and to theorize the extraordinary, the exceptional, and une autre differently.
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
Brown, Wendy. States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Butler, Judith. “Introduction.” In Bodies that Matter. New York: Routledge, 1993.
Crais, Clifton and Pamela Scully. Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus: A Ghost Story and a Biography. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Davis, Lennard J. “Constructing Normalcy” In Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body. New York: Verso, 1995.
De Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. New York: Vintage Books, 1989.
Foucault, Michael. Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975. New York: Picardor, 1999.
Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
Gilman, Sander L. “The Hottentot and the Prostitute: Toward and Iconography of Female Sexuality.” In Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness.
Goffman, Erving. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986.
Hacking, Ian. The Taming of Chance. Cambridge: UP, 1990.
Irigaray, Luce and Noah Guynn, “The Questions of the Other,” Yale French Studies 87 (1995): 7-19.
Lombroso, Cesare and Guglielmo Ferrero. Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman. Ed. Nicole Hahn Rafter and Mary Gibson. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.
Long, Charles H. Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of Religion. Aurora, Colorado: The Davies Group, 1995.
Portlock, Karin S. “Status on Trial: The Racial Ramifications of Admitting Prostitution Evidence Under State Rape Shield Legislation.” Columbia Law Review 107 (2007): 1404-1436.
Razack, Sherene. “Race, Space, and Prostitution: The Making of the Bourgeois Subject.” Canadian Journal of Women and Law 338 (1998): 338-376.
Sharpley-Whiting, T. Denean. Black Venus: Sexualized Savages, Primal Fears, and Primitive Narratives in French. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999.
 See Michael Foucault, Abnormal, 60.
 Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance, 5, 3.
 Lennard J. Davis, “Constructing Normalcy,” 26.
 Foucault, Abnormal, 61.
 See Clifton Crais and Pamela Scully, Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus, 15.
 T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, Black Venus: Sexualized Savages, Primal Fears, and Primitive Narratives.
 Foucault, Abnormal, 63.
 Crais and Scully, Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus, 80.
 Nicole Hahn Rafter and Mary Gibson, “Editors’ Introduction,” In Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman, 3.
 Crais and Scully, Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus, 147.
 Cesare Lombroso and Guglielmo Ferrero, Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman, 149.
 Foucault, Abnormal, 73.
 Lombroso and Ferrero, Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman, 143.
 Sharpley-Whiting, Black Venus, 65.
 Sander L. Gilman, “The Hottentot and the Prostitute: Towards an Iconography of Female Sexuality,” in Difference and Pathology, 99.
 Lombroso and Ferrero, Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman, 148, 185.
 Sharpley-Whiting, Black Venus, 72-73.
 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 267.
 Luce Irigaray and Noah Guynn, “The Question of the Other,” 7.
 Charles Long, “Introduction,” In Significations, 5.
 See Karin S. Portlock, “Status on Trial: The Racial Ramification of Admitting Prostitution Evidence Under State Rape Shield Legislation.”
 Irigaray and Guynn, “The Question of the Other,” 14.
 Wendy Brown, States of Injury, 48.
 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 11.
 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies, 7.
 See Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 5, 58, 191-192.
 See Irving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity.
 Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies, 8.
 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter, 3.